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There has been considerable debate over the role of comprehension strategies in the 
acquisition of temporal connectives. This study examined the role of clause logic and 
interpretational strategies in the acquisition of temporal words; age-related changes were also 
considered. Thirty-two children between 3 and 5 years of age served as subjects. Sentences 
with a variety of temporal words were used to tap children's comprehension of "before," 
"after," "when," "while," ']just before that," and "and after that." Clause logic was found 
to significantly improve the understanding of these sentences. However, the order of mention 
and main clause first strategies were used infrequently. Apparently, when children respond to 
sentences that describe information in a way that is consistent with what they normally hear, 
these strategies are seldom applied. 
There has been considerable interest in recent years in how children 
learn the meanings of sentences with temporal connectives, mainly before 
and after (Clark, 1971; Johnson, 1975; Trosborg, 1982). A recurrent 
theme in this research is the way children approach interpreting these 
sentences when they have not yet fully mastered their meaning. One 
difficulty in evaluating this has been that past approaches have not always 
looked at the relationship between age and the use of strategies for 
interpreting sentences with temporal connectives. Thus, it has not been 
clear whether the frequency and type of strategy change with age. 
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Furthermore, it has not always been possible to pull apart the effects of 
temporal connective and strategy--that is, whether the use of a particular 
comprehension strategy is triggered by a particular connective. The 
present study assesses how the use of comprehension strategies is affected 
by age, the semantics of a wide range of temporal connectives, and the 
meaning of  the clauses joined by the connectives. In this respect, the 
present investigation extends research on the role of contextual cues 
(clause logic) in learning the meaning of words (French & Brown, 1977) 
and the contribution of age-related strategies to interpreting temporal 
terms (Kavanaugh, 1979). 
Clause Logic 
The use of clause logic to interpret temporal connectives can be 
evaluated in several ways. One tack has been to compare contexts whose 
logic supports the meaning of such terms, as in 1, with those that do not, 
as in 2. 
1. The boy opened the can before he poured the soup. 
(LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP) 
2. The girl ate the cake after she opened the door. 
(ARBITRARY RELATIONSHIP) 
This is the method utilized in previous studies of some temporal terms 
(Kavanaugh, 1979; Trosborg, 1982). A second approach would be to 
look more closely at the effect of clause logic on the acquisition of 
particular connectives to discover whether some terms are aided by clause 
logic more than others. Here we would ask whether connectives whose 
meaning may be reinforced by clause content, such as before in number 
1 above, are learned earlier than those whose meaning is not (e.g., while 
in He opened the can while he drank the pop). The effect of clause logic 
also can be explored with multiple-sense connectives, such as when, 
whose interpretation may depend upon the logical relationship between 
the events described in the clauses as in 1 (logical) or 2 (arbitrary) above. 
These three approaches are considered in greater detail below. 
There has been a good deal of evidence for the view that children 
first learn the meaning of some temporal terms in sentences where the 
clause provides support for interpreting these terms. For example, French 
and Brown (1977) examined children's interpretations of sentences where 
the events in the clauses formed a logical series, Raggedy Ann fills the 
bottle before she feeds the baby, and others where the events were 
arbitrarily related, Raggedy Ann goes to bed after the dog runs away. 
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They found that performance on logical sequences was superior to that on 
arbitrary sequences. (see also Trosborg, 1982, for similar results.) This 
suggests that the children may have been using the relationship between 
the clauses to interpret such sentences. In this view, a child might have 
partial knowledge of the temporal terms, and the presence of clauses 
describing logically ordered events might be used to provide decisive 
information about the meaning of the connectives. However, the possi- 
bility exists that a child may have been relying on his world knowledge 
about the relation between the clause events to understand the sentences, 
not processing the connectives at all. Prior work does not provide a means 
of deciding between these alternatives. 
One way to show that a child is relying on his extralinguistic 
knowledge alone to process a sentence with logically related sequences is 
to observe his responses to sentences with events in r e v e r s e  of their 
logical order, as in 3 and 4. 
3. After the boy poured the soup, he opened the can. 
4. The boy ate the hot dog and after that he poured the ketchup. 
If a child is relying on the logical order of events to form his interpretation 
of these sentences rather than on knowledge of the connectives or on a 
combination of both, he should dramatize these sentences incorrectly, 
selecting as the first event the one that occurs first in a real-world series 
(e.g., The boy opened the can). 
Now let us c.onsider the reverse logical sequence in relation to the 
arbitrary and logical sequences used in previous work (French & Brown 
1977; Kavanaugh, 1979). If a child does not know the meaning of any 
temporal connectives and relies solely on his knowledge of event 
relationships in the world to interpret these sentences, he should interpret 
correctly all logical sequences and interpret incorrectly both reverse 
logical and arbitrary sequences. As he begins to learn the meaning of 
some connectives, presumably in logical sequences, he may still rely 
primarily on the clause relationship to assign a meaning to such 
sentences; however, where this is not possible (arbitrary sequences), he 
should begin to draw on his knowledge of the connectives. This would 
result in his responding correctly to logical sequences, failing many 
reverse logical sequences and giving some correct responses to arbitrary 
sentences. Finally, a child would take both clause content and the 
temporal connective into account. This set of predictions is similar to that 
of French and Brown (1977) but extends their model by including 
responses to reverse logical sequences in order to clarify when the clause 
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logic is being relied on to interpret these sentences to the exclusion of the 
temporal connective in the sentence. 
An additional role of clause logic in the acquisition of temporal 
connectives can be seen by comparing terms whose meaning can be 
learned by utilizing such clausal information (such as before, after, when) 
with a term that tends not to be (while). In particular, we would expect 
children to learn the meaning of contextually supported words (before, 
after) prior to that of while where the clause context provides little 
assistance. (See Ferreiro, 1971, for related work.) 
As the child learns more about the meaning of temporal connectives 
and about the role clause logic plays in the interpretation of sentences, we 
should begin to see him utilize this knowledge in new ways. The 
acquisition of a multiple-sense term such as when affords us a unique 
opportunity to observe children's use of clause logic to decide between 
alternate interpretations of a single word. For example, when may mean 
"af ter"  as in 5 and 6, or either "af ter"  or "whi le"  as in 7. 
5. When the boy opened the can, he poured the soup. 
6. The boy drank the juice when he opened the bottle. 
7. The boy ate the pancakes when he opened the soup. 
If a child uses the clause logic to interpret when, he ought to respond 
differently to sentences where the clauses are logically related (5 or 6) 
than to sentences where they are not (7). In this view, a child knows the 
senses of a term and recognizes that the logic of clauses should be used 
to select one reading over another. 
A second issue in the literature is the role of particular strategies in 
children's interpretations of sentences with temporal connectives. The 
use of clause logic to the exclusion of the temporal connectives in the 
sentences is one strategy that has been suggested above. Two other 
heuristics continue to be reported: an order of mention strategy and the 
main clause first strategy. These are described below. 
ORDER OF MENTION 
Most studies of temporal reference report that some children use an 
order of mention strategy to interpret sentences with temporal connectives 
(Bever, 1970; Clark, 1971; Johnson, 1975). In using the order of mention 
strategy, some children interpret sentences with temporal connectives by 
treating the order in which the events are mentioned as the order in which 
the events occurred. For example, in a comprehension task Clark (1971) 
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found that 3-year-olds treated sentences 8 and 9 identically, dramatizing 
the boy kicked the rock first. She also observed that this strategy 
decreased with age. 
8. The boy kicked the rock before he patted the dog. 
9. Before the boy kicked the rock, he patted the dog. 
MAIN CLAUSE FIRST 
Still other work reports that children use a main clause first strategy 
to process sentences with a connective. The main clause first strategy is 
just that--the child processes the main clause first. Three response 
patterns have been taken as evidence of this strategy: (a) Children ignore 
the event in the subordinate clause and do not dramatize it on a 
comprehension task (Amidon & Carey, 1972; French & Brown, 1977); 
only the main clause event is acted out; (b) children dramatize the main 
clause first and the subordinate clause second (Coker, 1978); (c) children 
correctly interpret sentences with the main clause first more often than 
those with a subordinate clause first (Keller-Cohen, 1974). 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN STRATEGIES AND OTHER 
VARIABLES 
Prior work has made significant strides in relating many of the 
interpretational strategies described above and task variables. However, 
important questions remain regarding developmental changes during the 
preschool years in the use of these strategies and in their interaction with 
the logic between events described in the clauses. It has been difficult to 
assess the developmental changes in the role of these strategies in part 
because of a potential confounding of the particular temporal connectives 
studied with interpretational strategies. For example, consider the fol- 
lowing sentence frames: (a) event 1 before event 2; (b) before event 2, 
event 1; (c) after event 1, event 2; (d) event 2 after event 1. 
A child who understands the meaning of before but not after would 
correctly interpret sentence frames (a) and (b) but not (c) and (d). 
However, this same response pattem would be found for children who 
process and dramatize the main clause before the subordinate clause 
(Coker, 1978). The present investigation addresses this problem by 
examining a wider range of temporal constructions, specifically before, 
after, but before that, and after that, when, and while. Questions also 
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remain about the changes with age in the role of both the order of mention 
and main clause interpretational strategies (Kavanaugh, 1979). This issue 
is examined here in four groups of preschool children from 3 to 5 years 
of age. 
Finally, the present study investigates the relationship between 
clause logic and interpretation strategy. This is accomplished by exam- 




Thirty-two children from the Ann Arbor and Buffalo areas served as 
subjects: 19 females and 13 males. The subjects were partitioned into four 
groups of eight children each: Group I (3 years 1 month-3 years 5 
months), Group II (3 years 6 months--3 years 11 months), Group III (4 
years 4 years 5 months), and Group IV (4 years 6 months-4 years 11 
months). 
Materials 
Children's interpretation of sentences with temporal connectives was 
measured by asking them to use toys to dramatize sentences read aloud. 
The toys were a boy and a girl doll and doll-sized objects such as tiny 
cans of soup, cake, keys, and bottles. In addition, a doll-sized door was 
constructed and attached to a frame so that a doll could be made to open 
a door. 
Instrument 
Each test consisted of 52 sentences. Each sentence consisted of a 
two-event sequence and there were three types of sequences: logical, 
reverse logical, and arbitrary. The logical sequences were those in which 
the events occurred in a predictable but noncausal order. For example, in 
The girl poured the syrup before she ate the pancakes the sequence is one 
we often witness but the eating of pancakes is not the result of pouring the 
syrup. Reverse logical sequences were those in which the event order was 
counter to what one would expect. For example, we normally blow out 
birthday candles before we cut the cake. Thus, After the girl cut the cake, 
Temporal Connectives 171 
she blew out the candles reverses this order. In arbitrary sequences, two 
events that have no predictable temporal relationship are described, as in 
The boy opened the door after he ate the pancakes. 
Eight constructions (types 10-17 below) used twice formed the 16 
sentences for the logical and the 16 sentences for the reverse logical order 
conditions; 10 constructions (10-19 below) used twice formed the 
sentences for the arbitrary order condition. Due to a clerical error, one 
occurrence of but before that was omitted from the logical order 
condition, leaving 15 rather than 16 sentences in that condition only. Ten 
constructions were used: 
10. X before Y 
11. After X, Y 
12. X and after that Y 
13. When X, Y 
14. Before X, Y 
15. Y after X 
16. Y but before that X 
17. Y when X 
18. X while Y 
19. While X, Y 
For purposes of analysis, these 10 constructions were collapsed into three 
categories that described the semantic relationships expressed by the 
following constructions: Simple Sequence (10, 11, 12), where events are 
described in their order of occurrence; Reverse Sequence (14, 15, 16), 
where events are described in reverse of their order of occurrence; and 
Simultaneity (18, 19), where events are described that cooccur. Sen- 
tences with when (13 and 17) can be used to describe either sequential or 
simultaneous events. In the sequential reading, 13 describes simple 
sequence and 17 reverse sequence. In their simultaneity reading, 13 and 
17 describe cooccurring events. 
The first eight constructions appeared in all three logic conditions. 
Sentences with while appeared in the arbitrary order condition only since 
while does not sequentially order events. 
Design 
Four randomizations (versions) of the 52 test sentences were 
prepared. Each version was divided into two parts, A and B. This resulted 
in eight versions: version 1 AB, version 1 BA . . . version 4 BA. An 
equal number of subjects (n = 4) received each of the versions. 
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The overall design initially included six independent variables: age, 
version, and order in which the version half was presented were 
between-subject variables; clause logic (logical, reverse logical, arbi- 
trary), temporal relationship (simple sequence, reverse sequence, and 
simultaneity), and subordinate clause position were within-subject vari- 
ables. 
Procedure 
A female experimenter tested each child separately. After several 
minutes of casual conversation, the experimenter demonstrated each of 
the events a child would hear in the stimulus sentences. Then the child 
was asked to dramatize each of these events; no child had any difficulty 
learning these dramatizations. Indeed, the children were uniformly 
delighted with the minature objects and eager to have the opportunity to 
use them. After this preliminary period the experimenter began the test, 
reading each sentence only twice. In the event that a child became 
distracted, the experimenter returned to the sentence at the end of the test. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses were aimed at determining the effect of the test 
version and the effect of the order in which the version half was 
presented. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no main effect for 
version, F(3, 24) = 1.32, or half order, F(4, 24) = 3.62. Thus, these 
two variables were excluded from subsequent analyses, leaving four 
variables remaining, (age, clause logic, temporal relationship, and 
subordinate clause position). 
The first stage of the analysis was aimed at examining children's use 
of clause logic to understand sentences with temporal connectives. The 
investigation consisted of three steps. First, we explored whether the 
logical relationship between events in two clauses influenced children's 
interpretation of temporal connectives. If this was so, sentences with 
clauses describing events in a predictable sequence (The girl opened the 
can; She poured the soup) should be easier to understand than those 
where the events do not occur in a predictable order (The boy picked up 
the key; He ate the pancakes). All temporal connectives except when 
were included in this analysis. Responses to when were analyzed 
separately because the opportunity for a correct response to sentences 
with when was greater since either an "af ter"  or a "whi le"  interpretation 
was considered acceptable. The second step in examining the effect of 
clause logic was to compare performance on sentences with connectives 
Temporal Connectives 
Table I. Proportion of Correct Responses by Age a 
Clause logic 
Age group Logical Reverse logical 
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Arbitrary 
I .88 .34 .48 b 
II .64 .49 .61 c 
III .86 .60 .57 
IV .93 .72 .80 d 
J~ .83 .54 .62 
aExcluding sentences with when. 
Comparisons between Reverse Logical and Arbitrary orders: 
bp < .005. 
Cp < .025. 
~p < .050. 
whose meaning is reinforced by clause logic (e.g., before in The girl 
opened the can before she drank the juice) with those where the meaning 
of the connective is not (while). The third part of this analysis focused on 
the role clause logic plays in the interpretation of a connective with 
multiple meanings. In particular, we wondered whether children's 
interpretation of when depended on the logic of the clauses with which it 
occurred. For example, we explored whether they were more likely to 
interpret when as after rather than as while in the following sentences: The 
girl ate the hot dog when she poured the ketchup; When the boy opened 
the box, he poured the cereal. 
As predicted, there was a main effect for clause logic, F(2, 56) = 
41.55, p < .001. The proportion correct was greatest on logical order 
sentences (83%) and considerably worse on arbitrary order (62%) and 
reverse logical order sentences (54%). In Groups I, II, and IV perfor- 
mance on arbitrarily related events was significantly better than on 
reverse logical events, although the magnitude of difference decreased 
with age. The number of correct responses on all three categories 
increased with age, F(3, 28) = 4.02, p < .05. This is summarized in 
Table I. 
The influence of clause logic can also be seen in the children's 
performance on contextually unsupported while as compared to the 
connectives (before, but before that, after, and after that) that may 
receive contextual support. We compared the frequency of correct 
responses to each of these constructions in the arbitrary clause relation 
condition. Sentences in this condition only were used since while did not 
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Table II, Proportion of "Af te r"  and "Whi le"  Interpretations of When" 
I I l 
Clause logic 
Age group Logical Arbitrary 
I "After" .72 .53 
"While" .09 .03 
II "After" .78 .59 
"While" .06 .09 
III "After" .78 .59 
"While" .06 .13 
IV "After" .59 .53 
"While" .22 .38 
aThe "after" and "while" responses do not sum to 1.00 because children produced other 
responses to when sentences. These include omissions of one of the clauses and "before" or 
reversal responses. 
appear in the natural or reverse natural order conditions. If clause logic 
helps children learn the meaning of temporal connectives, we would 
expect children to learn first terms whose meaning is reinforced by clause 
logic (before, after) and later master terms that are not (while). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for temporal construc- 
tion F(2, 56) = 34.62, p < .001. Children produced a significantly 
greater number of correct responses on all constructions with before and 
after than on sentences with while, T(31) = 7.06, p < .001. 
Responses to when provided additional information about the effect 
of clause relationship. An analysis of variance revealed that clause logic 
significantly affected interpretations of when, F(2, 56) = 13.13, p < 
.001. A closer look at this appears in Table II. 
"Af ter"  interpretations of when were more frequent in the logical 
than in the arbitrary condition; this pattern is stable until 5 years of age, 
where the difference nearly disappears. This decrease may be due in part 
to the acquisition of the "whi le"  sense of when, which begins to be more 
frequent at age 5, undoubtedly replacing some "af ter"  interpretations. A 
"while"  reading of when accounted for few responses until 5 years of 
age, when it became more frequent in the arbitrary than in the logical 
condition. 
Interpretational Strategies 
One of the central questions in this study was how children modify 
their strategies for interpreting temporal connectives as they grow older. 
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The next set of analyses examined changes in three interpretational 
strategies: Logical Order, Order of Mention, and Main Clause First. 
Each child's responses were scored for evidence of each of these 
strategies. As in French & Brown (1977), a child was considered to use 
a strategy if the majority (75% or more) of his responses corresponded to 
the criteria described under a particular strategy outlined below. The 
scoring procedures were as follows: 
Logical Order Strategy 
The data for this analysis were responses to all sentences where the 
event pairs could be thought of as having a logical order whether or not 
they were described in that order. Thus, reverse logical order sentences 
were included since the events had a logical order even though they were 
described in reverse of that order. All responses to both logical and 
reverse logical order sentences were included, and responses to arbitrarily 
related sentences were excluded. A child received 1 point every time he 
dramatized the events in the clauses in their logical order of occurrence. 
Examples of stimulus sentences and logical order responses to them 
appear below: 
20. S Before the boy opened the door, he picked up the key. 
R (a) boy pick up key (b) boy open door 
21. S After the girl poured the syrup, she ate the pancakes. 
R (a) girl pour syrup (b) girl eat pancakes 
22. S The girl poured the soup before she opened the can. 
R (a) girl open can (b) girl pour soup 
23. S The boy cut the cake but before that he blew out the 
candles. 
R (a) boy blow out candles (b) boy cut cake 
Order of Mention Strategy 
Responses to all sentences were included. A child received 1 point 
for every response in which he dramatized the clauses in the order in 







The boy ate the hot dog when he opened the bottle. 
(a) boy eat hot dog (b) boy open bottle 
After the girl opened the bottle, she drank the pop. 
(a) girl open bottle (b) girl drank pop 
The boy cut the cake but before that he blew out the 
candles. 
(a) boy cut cake (b) boy blow out candles 
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Main Clause First Strategy 
If a child processes the main clause before the subordinate clause at 
least two outcomes are possible: 
1. He interprets the event in the main clause as the first event and the 
event in the subordinate clause as the second event, dramatizing the main 
clause before the subordinate Clause. A child was viewed as using this 
version of the main clause first strategy if in 75% or more of his responses 
he dramatized the main clause first and the subordinate clause second. 
This is the view of the main clause first strategy adopted in Coker (1978). 
This can be seen below: 
27. S The girl poured the soup but before that she opened the can. 
R (a) girl pour soup (b) girl open can 
28. S After the boy opened the door, he ate the hot dog. 
R (a) boy eat hot dog (b) boy open door 
2. The child forgets or ignores the subordinate clause, dramatizing 
only the main clause (French & Brown, 1977; Johnson, 1975). If a child 
omitted the subordinate clause in 75% or more of his responses, he was 
regarded as using this version of the main clause strategy. In sum, then, 
each child's responses were examined for evidence that he used any of the 
above strategies. For the main clause strategy, each of the possible 
interpretations was tallied separately. 
Our general analytic approach was to determine first whether a 
child's overall response patterns could be characterized by any of the 
preceding strategies. Then we explored the interaction between strategy 
use and clause logic. Hence, the 75% criterion was first applied to the 
sentences overall, then later separately to sentences in each of the three 
clause logic conditions. The frequency of strategy use by age for all 
sentences in all three logic conditions is summarized in Table III. 
Using the 75% criterion levels, nine children used one interpreta- 
tional strategy: three from Group I, three from Group II, two from Group 
III, and one from Group IV. So while strategy use was modest, it 
decreased with age. The logical order strategy was used by eight of these 
nine children; the order of mention was used by the remaining one. None 
of the children gave evidence of using a main clause first strategy 
according to either of the versions of this strategy. No child dramatized 
the main clause before the subordinate clause in 75% of his responses 
(view 1 of the main clause first strategy). The highest proportion of 
responses conforming to this was 63% (32 out of 51 responses; four 
children at 61% and one child at 63%). Four of these children were in 
Temporal Connectives 
Table I lL  Frequency of Major Strategy Use by Age a 
Strategy 
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Age group Logical order Order of mention Main clause first b 
I 3 0 0 
II 3 0 0 
III 1 1 0 
IV 1 0 0 
~Number of children at each age. 
bEach main clause first analysis was computed separately. 
Group I, one in Group III. Similarly, subordinate clauses were not 
omitted with any frequency (view 2). In fact, this was the least used 
response pattern. Sixteen children never omitted any subordinate clause 
and only one child omitted as many as 4 of 51 subordinate clauses. 
Our final step was to examine the effect of clause logic on strategy 
use. We first examined the relationship between clause logic and the 
logical order strategy in its use in the reverse logical order condition. To 
understand this approach, consider the following. In the logical order 
condition, a child could correctly interpret a sentence such as 29 using 
any one of the several approaches: by dramatizing the events in the 
sequence to which he has become accustomed from his experience in the 
world, by relying on the meaning of the temporal connective, or a 
combination of both. Accordingly, evidence from the logical order 
condition alone is an insufficient test of his use of real-world knowledge 
in interpreting the sentence types tested here. In contrast, if a child relies 
solely on his knowledge of how events are related in the world to interpret 
a sentence such as 30, he would always dramatize such events in reverse 
of the order described in the sentence. A reversal response to 30 would be 
girl open can, girl pour soup. 
LOGICAL 29. The girl poured the soup after she opened the can. 
ORDER 
REVERSE 30. The girl opened the can after she poured the soup. 
ORDER 
As such, a consistent pattern of reversal responses in the reverse logical 
condition would be strong evidence that event relationship was used to 
the exclusion of other information in the sentence. If reversal responses 
were not consistently offered, it would suggest that children are utilizing 
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T a b l e  IV .  Clause Logic and Logical 
Order Strategy Use 
Clause logic 
Age Logical Reverse logical 
I 5 2 
I 6 1 
III 6 0 
IV 6 1 
Keller-Cohen 
Table V. Clause Logic and Order of Mention Strategy Use a 
Clause logic 
Age group Logical Reverse logical Arbitrary 
I 0 0 2 
II l 3 b 1 
III 0 1 2 c 
IV 0 0 0 
I 
aNumber of children employing the order of mention strategy in each clause logic condition. 
bOne child in Group I! used this strategy in both the Logical Order and Reverse Logical 
conditions. 
cOne child in Group III used this strategy in both the Reverse Logical and Arbitrary conditions. 
both clause logic and the meaning of the temporal connective. Responses 
to sentences in the arbitrary condition were excluded from this analysis 
because the events described do not occur in a predictable order. These 
results are summarized in Table IV. 
The logical order strategy was applied regularly at all ages in the 
logical order condition only; it occurred seldom in the reverse logical 
order condition, which was the more stringent test of its use. This 
suggests that while some children and more at the younger ages may rely 
solely on their knowledge of predictable event patterns to interpret 
sentences (as can be seen in Table IV, Reverse Logic condition), most 
seem to utilize the meaning of the temporal connective too. 
Next we examined the use of the order of mention strategy in the 
three clause logic conditions. This can be seen in Table V. Eight different 
children (two in Group I, four in Group II, and two in Group III) used an 
order of mention strategy as their modal response in at least one of the 
Temporal Connectives 
Table VI. Main Clause First Strategy a and Clause Logic 
Clause logic 
Age group Logical Reverse logical 
179 
Arbitrary 
I 0 1 0 
II 0 2 0 
III 0 0 0 
IV 0 1 0 
~Version 1 (dramatize main clause first, subordinate clause second). 
clause logic conditions. Use of this strategy occurred least often in the 
logical condition, where the clause context could be used to correctly 
interpret the sentences. No child in Group IV applied this strategy to 
interpret the test sentences. 
Last, we explored whether the main clause first strategy varied with 
clause logic even though no child used this as a general interpretational 
heuristic. We did not consider version 2 (omission of the subordinate 
clause) since the maximum number of subordinate clauses omitted over 
all three clause conditions was four. As for version 1 (main clause 
dramatized first, subordinate clause second), no children employed this in 
response either to logically or arbitrarily related clauses. Four children 
used it in the reverse logical clause condition, although no clear 
age-related pattern was evident. This is summarized in Table V[. 
DISCUSSION 
Clause Logic 
The role of clause logic reported here is consistent with previous 
findings (French & Brown, 1977; Kavanaugh, 1979). Children generally 
were more successful at interpreting sentences where the clause context 
reinforced interpretation of the temporal connectives (logical condition) 
than where it did not (reverse logical and arbitrary). In fact, in the reverse 
logical condition where the connective was at odds with the clause 
context, children had the greatest difficulty understanding the test 
sentences. This was true in Groups I, II, and IV; in Group III the 
proportion of correct responses to arbitrary and reverse logical sequences 
was nearly equal. 
Clause context also was found to be important in determining the 
relative order in which particular temporal connectives are acquired and 
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in helping a child decide between the senses of a temporally ambiguous 
term. Contextually supported terms, before and after were learned earlier 
than while. (This is supported by Feagans, 1980.) Similarly, the sense of 
when that can be discovered from clause relationship ("af ter")  is learned 
earlier than the unsupported sense ("while") .  
At 3 years of age we begin to see evidence that clause context 
influences the interpretation of multiple-sense lexical items, and that by 
age 5 this effect is stronger. Recall that "af ter"  interpretations of when 
generally were more commonplace in the logical as against the arbitrary 
condition. However, since while responses were so infrequent at that age, 
it could not be claimed that children chose between alternate senses of 
when based on context. Rather, by 5 years of age, "whi le"  readings of 
when begin to appear with some regularity in both the logical and 
arbitrary conditions, but more so in the latter. This suggests that clause 
content is now playing a more important role in choosing between 
alternate senses of a lexical item. Information from more children would 
be necessary to clarify this picture, as would data from a range of 
multiple-sense terms. 
Although clause logic was found to play a role, it does not account 
for many of the responses here. The finding that clause context assisted 
logical order but not reverse logical order sequences suggests that even at 
the ages studied, children are not relying solely on clause context for their 
interpretation of temporal terms. This is consistent with Stroehner and 
Nelson (1974), who report a developmental shift from extralinguistic 
strategies such as event probability to the syntactic interpretation of 
sentences. (See also Bever, 1970; Cromer, 1976). 
If children were relying solely or primarily on clause context, we 
would have found them reversing the reverse logical events--e.g. ,  The 
girl blew out the candles after she cut the cake dramatized as (1) girl blow 
out candles, (2) girl cut cake. Instead we saw that only 6 of 16 children 
seemed to rely primarily on clause context for their interpretation (Table 
III). The rest were apparently including some interpretation of the 
temporal connective too. So while clause context plays a role in the first 
few years of life, by 3 years of age children are taking into account other 
types of information in their emerging views of word meaning. This study 
leaves open what that information is, how children coordinate and 
integrate the data they collect about words, and the form in which they 
represent it. 
One alternate interpretation of the role of clause context reported 
here is that it would have been difficult for the children to perform some 
actions in reverse of their logical order--for example, pouring the soup 
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before opening the can. Hence, the logical order was the result of 
behavioral biases. This potential confounding was taken into account in 
task design. As part of the instructions and preliminary rehearsal prior to 
the test items, children were shown how to dramatize the stimulus events 
and these dramatizations were symbolic. The soup can was not actually 
opened; rather each child was shown how to move the doll's hand as 
though he/she were opening the can. 3 All children expressed delight at 
this training and none displayed any difficulty dramatizing the events. As 
such, physical difficulty cannot satisfactorily explain the pattern of results 
observed here. 
Interpretational Strategies 
The role of clause logic reported here extends our view of the 
contribution of interpretational strategies to the acquisition of temporal 
connectives. Twenty-eight percent (9) of the children studied used a 
nonlinguistic strategy to respond to the test sentences. Eight of these 
adopted the logical order strategy, dramatizing the sentences according to 
their knowledge of how such events are sequenced in the real world. Two 
previously reported strategies---order of mention and main clause first--  
were found to play at most a secondary role in interpreting sentences with 
temporal connectives. When all logic conditions were taken together, 
only one child used the order of mention strategy. None used either 
version of the main clause first strategy. Omissions of subordinate clause 
events were negligible. Furthermore, no child adopted a general strategy 
of dramatizing the main clause first and the subordinate clause second. 
When clause logic was taken into account a somewhat more complex 
picture emerged. Neither the order of mention or main clause strategies 
was applied routinely to sentences in the logical order condition. The 
higher rate of strategy use reported elsewhere (Clark, 1971; Amidon & 
Carey, 1972) would seem to be a function of the limited range of 
temporal connectives studied and the characteristics of the tasks 
(Johnson, 1975). 
In previous work, it was suggested that the variation among studies 
in the omission rates 0f subordinate clauses that, as will be recalled, was 
evidence for the main clause strategy, may arise from task differences. 
Johnson (1975) found that omissions were greater in response to 
3Undoubtedly these were like a good deal of the dramatic play in which preschool children 
spontaneously engage. 
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imperatives (e.g., Amidon & Carey, 1972) than to nonimperatives (e.g., 
Clark, 1971). In the present investigation, the low rate of omissions may 
also have been due to the type of sentences used. Since many of the 
sentences described logically related events, children may have devel- 
oped a mental set toward relating pairs of events. Even so, much of the 
language children hear in their early years describes these very sorts of 
events and therefore it would seem likely that children pay attention to 
both events in a sentence under normal conditions. 
Although this study provides clues to the contribution of clause 
context, it does not provide evidence on what sorts of evidence children 
need in order to refine their interpretations of temporal terms. Specifi- 
cally, what types of experiences could draw their attention to the 
limitations on the logical order strategy? We know that a good deal of 
children's experience is with routine, often ritualized patterns that 
undoubtedly reinforce hypotheses based on probability. They know that 
they have their diapers changed before sleep and their food cut up before 
eating. One possible input to this process of refining probability-based 
hypotheses would be adult behaviors that direct a child's attention to the 
unexpected or nonroutine, making it more salient. This might consist of 
gestural indicators to the unexpected or might include linguistic strings 
that contrast the unexpected with the routine, "He did it after, not 
before", perhaps reinforced by emphatic stress. By highlighting viola- 
tions of norm, adults may help draw children's attention to the data 
needed to modify their hypotheses about word meaning. As children 
grow older, they are exposed to greater environmental variation, and this 
too provides not only experience with deviations from the routine but talk 
about these deviations. This line of inquiry would then be part of a more 
general exploration of how children make the transition from 
nonlinguistic to linguistically based hypotheses. This is to say that we 
will need to seek a more comprehensive picture of the types of 
language-based information to which children begin to attend, such as the 
kinds of syntactic detail that contribute to meaning, in order to understand 
more fully how temporal connectives are acquired. 
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